Perceptions of Mental Illness in the Legal System by Wallace, Krista
University at Albany, State University of New York
Scholars Archive
Criminal Justice Honors College
12-2012
Perceptions of Mental Illness in the Legal System
Krista Wallace
University at Albany, State University of New York
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/honorscollege_cj
Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College at Scholars Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Criminal
Justice by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wallace, Krista, "Perceptions of Mental Illness in the Legal System" (2012). Criminal Justice. 4.
https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/honorscollege_cj/4
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceptions of Mental Illness in the Legal System 
School of Criminal Justice 
Krista Wallace 
Research Advisor: Allison Redlich, Ph.D 
December 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Previous research suggests that there are stereotypes and misperceptions about the 
mentally ill population which affect juror’s decision making in cases where the insanity defense 
is raised. Many individuals believe it to be a “loophole” in the criminal justice system for 
offenders to escape punishment (Skeem and Golding, 2002). This study explores community 
perceptions of schizophrenia and personality disorders in a legal context. Results support that 
individuals are significantly less confident of their verdict decisions when the offender has a 
mental illness than when the offender has no mental illness. In addition, the presence of a mental 
illness significantly affects punishment choice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 The legal system assumes that jurors are “blank slates” who objectively decide on the 
facts presented at trial to reach a legally appropriate verdict. However, research suggests that 
jurors have stereotypes about offenders and preconceptions which cause bias in their decision 
making (Skeem and Golding, 2002). These attitudes and preconceptions are especially 
detrimental in cases where defendants raise the controversial defense of insanity. Individuals 
with a serious mental illness (SMI) are at an increased risk for entering the criminal justice 
system, both as victims and offenders. There are many misconceptions about this population and 
it is widely perceived that they are dangerous and unpredictable (Bonta et al., 1998). This study 
will explore how community perceptions of mental illness affect their perceptions of culpability 
and how people perceive offenders with personality disorders in comparison to offenders with 
schizophrenia and those with no mental illness.  
Perceptions of Mental Illness 
Research suggests that negative attitudes toward the insanity defense are prevalent, 
highly influential on juror’s decision making, and change resistant. In fact, laypeople often 
express that the insanity defense is a “loophole” in the criminal justice system which allows 
guilty criminals to escape punishment (Skeem and Golding, 2002). Pasewark and Seidenzahl 
(1979), as cited by Skeem and Golding, found that laypeople believed insanity was raised in 37% 
of criminal cases, when the actual rate is less than 1%. This is a gross exaggeration by 41 times. 
In addition, even after being provided with the correct statistics, half the people maintained their 
misconceptions. A study by Minster and Knowles (2006) found that 95% of Americans believe 
mentally ill people are potentially violent. Although knowledge about mental illness in the 
general population has increased since the 1950s, so too has the perception that the mentally ill 
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are violent. The MacArthur Mental Health Module (1996), as cited by Minster and Knowles, 
revealed that in 1950, 4% of individuals believed the mentally ill had the potential to be violent, 
in contrast to 44% of people believing the mentally ill were violent in 1996. These 
misconceptions are extremely influential on juror’s decision making and consequently on the fate 
of individuals with mental illness who enter the criminal justice system as offenders. As we will 
see, much research has focused on individuals with serious mental illness- mainly psychotic 
disorders- but there is a lack of research on many other mental illnesses such as personality 
disorders which are common to offenders.  
 
 
Legal Insanity 
 The definition of legal insanity has been changing for centuries and continues to change 
today. The term “mental illness” has different connotations in a legal and psychological sense. In 
a psychological sense, a person must meet the criteria of a disorder listed in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (2000) to be 
diagnosed with a mental illness. However, in a legal context, a person must be found insane by 
the courts according to four pre-determined tests of insanity. According to the courts, volition 
and responsibility determine whether and how much punishment an offender should receive 
(Monahan and Hood, 1976).  
 In contrast to the DSM-IV and the psychological definition of a mental impairment, the 
legal definition of insanity is the basis for determining if someone is responsible for a crime. A 
crime requires two elements. The first element is proof of an act that is specifically prohibited by 
law or actus reus. The second element is sufficient intention to commit the act or mens rea 
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(Kinscherff, 2010). Three ways a person can be excused from or justified for committing a crime 
is if he acted in self-defense, if he was forced to commit the crime by another individual, or if he 
is legally insane (Slovenko, 1969).  
The first guidelines for a test of insanity in American and English courts were based on 
the 1843 trial of Daniel M’Naghten in England. The M’Nagthen rules created during this trial 
establish that every person is presumed to be of “sound” mind unless they can prove otherwise 
(Slovenko, 1969). As stated by Robinson and Dubber (2007), to prove an insanity defense “At 
the time of committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, 
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he 
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong” (page 338). 
 To support an insanity defense, the individual must prove that he was functionally 
impaired at the time of the offense as a direct result of a mental disease. The burden of proof is 
on the defendant, meaning that he must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is in fact insane 
and not responsible for the act. If a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, he is 
acquitted of the crime and committed to a psychiatric institution for an indeterminate period of 
time until deemed safe to return to the community. The person is not regarded as insane solely 
because of a diagnosis of a mental disorder, but must prove that it was the specific disorder that 
led to commission of the crime (Kinscherff, 2010). Perspective jurors may be reluctant to deliver 
a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict because it could be seen as an escape of punishment. 
However, an individual found insane by the courts may spend more time in a psychiatric 
institution than he would have spent in prison had he been found guilty of the crime. Where case 
verdicts should be black and white- guilty or not guilty- jurors perceive the verdict of not guilty 
by reason of insanity as a shade of grey (Skeem and Golding, 2002). 
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 The definition of legal insanity leaves room for interpretation although it is meant to be 
as objective as possible. Even with the varying definitions of insanity in the past century, 
insanity convictions remain stable. This suggests jurors are more subjective than objective in 
their decisions. Mock jurors who received no insanity test instructions or who are told to use 
their own “best lights” to decide a verdict on a case produced patterns similar to those of mock 
jurors who receive explicit insanity test instructions, adding more support to this suggestion 
(Skeem and Golding, 2002). Roberts and Golding (1991), cited by Skeem and Golding, suggest 
that the way jurors reach their verdict is associated with their attitudes toward the insanity 
defense. When defendants are perceived as being more disordered, subjects are more likely to 
favor an insanity verdict. 
Juror’s Perceptions of Insanity 
 According to Vicki Smith’s prototype theory, as cited by Skeem and Golding (2002), a 
juror may make attributions about a defendant’s cognitive and volitional impairment by 
comparing the defendant’s characteristics to those of his or her prototype of a criminally insane 
defendant. Many things can contribute to an individual’s prototype of an insane defendant. 
News, media, and individual histories and interactions with the mentally ill population could 
play a role in creating these prototypes. According to prototype theory, the more closely a 
defendant’s attributes match those of the juror’s prototype, the more likely he or she is to judge 
the defendant criminally insane.  
 A study by Finkel and Groscup (1997), which examined student’s perceptions of insanity 
as related to the media, asked undergraduate students to create typical and atypical narratives 
about defendants who successfully or unsuccessfully plead insanity at trial. Students asked to 
create a typical narrative were given the instructions "I want you to construct a typical insanity 
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case, where a defendant has been charged with a crime, and where he or she pleads not guilty by 
reason of insanity. I want you to make this case end successfully (or unsuccessfully) for the 
defendant, as the Jury will find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity," (page 215). Two 
hundred ninety two narratives were collected for this study, ranging in length from half a page to 
five pages. Stories were categorized by two raters into over 30 specific dimensions. There were 
no significant differences found between the typical and atypical narratives in any of the 30 
dimensions. Finkel and Groscup suggested that all narratives leaned more toward extraordinary 
Hollywood stories than toward typical crimes. For the successful plea, students often described a 
young male defendant with a documented psychiatric history who committed a crime against 
another male on the basis of grandiose delusions. For the unsuccessful insanity plea, students 
described a young male defendant who committed a crime against another young male on the 
basis of revenge. Therefore, students did not deem emotional reactions (which are not mental 
illnesses), such as revenge-seeking, to merit a valid insanity defense.  
A study by Minster and Knowles (2006) compared the perceptions of the need for legal 
coercion for treatment of mental illness in lawyers and in a community sample. The aims of the 
study were to assess if the lawyer’s perceptions of need for legal coercion to treat people with 
schizophrenia or depression differ from those of a community sample and to assess if perceptions 
of dangerousness differ between legal professionals and the general community. Forty six 
lawyers and a matched community sample of 44 individuals were polled. The study used three 
vignettes about one of three characters followed by a survey. The depression vignette described a 
man who had been depressed for two weeks. The schizophrenia vignette described a person with 
paranoia who heard voices and had trouble sleeping and a ‘troubled vignette’ described someone 
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who occasionally felt worried and sad. Overall, 39% of individuals identified depression in the 
vignette and 27% correctly identified schizophrenia.  
 The survey questions were designed to assess if individuals believed people with mental 
illness should face forced treatments. Individuals were asked if the individual in the vignette 
should be forced by law to obtain treatment from a clinic or a doctor, take prescription 
medication, or be admitted to the hospital. A majority of both legal professionals and community 
members believed there should be forced legal coercion and medical treatment for the character 
with schizophrenia, but not the character with depression (Minster and Knowles, 2006). This is 
an important finding and suggests that a majority of individuals in the study would support 
commitment to a psychiatric institution as treatment for an individual with schizophrenia. 
However, this study did not examine forced legal coercion as punishment for a crime and as an 
alternative to prison.  
 Results of the study by Minster and Knowles (2006) do not directly assess community 
perceptions on the culpability of offenders with mental illnesses but are relevant to the topic. 
Results showed the community to greatly exaggerate the likelihood of violence in individuals 
with mental illness. It also showed that a majority of the community supported legal coercion for 
these individuals and an inability to identify depression and schizophrenia given examples.  
 A multilevel study by Skeem and Golding (2002) attempted to determine how individuals 
construe to what degree of control an individual has over his criminal actions and how this 
affects their verdict choice. Part I of their study asked 80 individuals to candidly describe the 
characteristics common to their conception of the typical insane person who is not responsible 
for their actions because of mental illness. Results were multifaceted and could not be reduced to 
legal formulations or even to single, abstract themes. They were, however, found to be 
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thoughtful responses generally free from bizarre, dramatic features. Each juror listed an average 
of 7 characteristics. Typical responses consisted of two to three mental state themes (e.g. 
illogical, incomprehensible, delusion-based crime) and a description of the person’s human 
characteristics. As stated, the results were multifaceted and only 2 features were listed by 15 or 
more jurors. The features that jurors used most frequently were unable to discern right from 
wrong (n=25); unable to function in society (n=15); mentally retarded (n=14); irrational (n=14); 
and cannot control his thoughts, emotions, or actions (n=12). Part II of the study attempted to 
categorize and combine features into prototype characteristics. Researchers extracted 498 main 
ideas from the responses in Part I of the study which were coded into 10 categories. Five jurors 
were asked to sort the characteristics into as many categories as necessary of features that meant 
“essentially the same thing.” Results showed significant differences in juror’s conceptions of 
insanity. Jurors did not agree on even a subset of features that characterize insanity. 
Part III of the study by Skeem and Golding (2002) used responses from Part I of the 
study to create a Conception Checklist, which was used to create prototypes of offenders used in 
the vignette study. Participants were given vignettes, placing themselves in the role of a juror in 
the case. They were asked to render a verdict, indicate on a scale of 0 to 100 the likelihood that 
they would find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, and describe their perception of 
the individual on several Likert Scales. Three prototypes were derived from the Conception 
Checklist: severely mentally disabled (SMD), morally insane (MI), and mental state-centered 
(MSC). All three groups accentuate features of psychosis and emphasize characteristics related 
to impaired mental state at the time of the offense, such as inability to discern right from wrong 
and a lack of awareness about what one is doing. Therefore, despite the specific prototype an 
individual may have, several key characteristics are likely to be incorporated, especially 
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characteristics related to psychosis. Since the prototypes have indefinite boundaries, several 
factors are likely to overlap. Two interesting findings of the study are that jurors are more likely 
to deem defendants with physical impairments such as mental retardation insane than those with 
“strictly psychiatric impairments” and if a defendant has tried to control the disease, such as with 
medication or therapy, jurors are more likely to find them not guilty. Results of this part of the 
study further emphasize that the perceptions of individuals and the research on insanity is highly 
focused on schizophrenia and psychosis.  
The prototype represented by 47% of jurors was an individual with a SMD prototype. 
This prototype emphasizes severe functional impairment, intellectual disability, and 
characteristics that are long-standing and resistant to treatment. This prototype is consistent with 
the “wild beast standard” in tests of insanity dating to 1724. The SMD individual is animalistic, 
deprived of the ability to reason, and morality is out of his control. Additionally, the SMD 
prototype has done everything in his control to control the impairment, including medication and 
therapy. Interestingly, results from this study suggest that almost half of the subjects melded 
together characteristics of psychosis and mental retardation in a way to create the prototype of an 
insane person, though this is generally inaccurate.  
 The mental state-centered characteristics (MSC) prototype, represented by 21% of jurors, 
focuses solely on issues relevant to the nature and extent of the defendant’s impaired mental state 
at the time of the offense. Incapable of discerning right from wrong and more than “temporarily” 
insane are the most commonly reported characteristics of this prototype. This prototype shares 
most of its characteristics with the other two prototypes. 
 The morally insane prototype (MI), which represented 33% of jurors in the study, most 
closely resembles the modern conception of psychosis. The most common reported 
12 
 
characteristics of MI were no conscience; grossly distorted vision of reality; violent, angry, and 
hostile to others; extreme, unpredictable behavior; and acts without reason or provocation. This 
prototype reflects a “selectively diseased individual who is otherwise intact” (Skeem and 
Golding, 2002). In the 20th century, the term moral insanity was gradually replaced by the terms 
psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder. Skeem and Golding point out the resemblance 
of this prototype to the stereotypical criminally insane individual presented by the media which 
is characterized as manipulative, antisocial, and clear-thinking. Psychotic individuals have 
impairments in both will and reason that render them less culpable and therefore not criminally 
responsible, however jurors in Skeem and Golding’s (2002) study explained that it was difficult 
where to draw the line between psychopathy and insanity.  
 In summary, jurors represented in the study had three prototypes of insanity, which are 
important to the way they construe individual responsibility and reach a legal decision. The three 
prototypes differed significantly on the construal and insanity likelihood ratings in the vignette 
portion of the study by Skeem and Golding (2002). These items included variables such as 
defendant suffers from a mental disorder, defendant appreciated what he was doing was wrong 
before he acted, defendant was capable of perceiving reasonable alternatives to what he did, 
defendant should be punished, and rating of likelihood of personal finding that defendant is not 
guilty by reason of insanity.   
 
Personality Disorders 
Although the term moral insanity encompasses antisocial personality disorder, it is 
necessary to examine other personality disorders as well. Personality disorders have one of the 
highest comorbidity rates with other mental illnesses. A study by Joyal (2011) found that 68.5% 
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of the population of a psychiatric hospital had comorbid personality disorders in addition to their 
main diagnosis. A study by Blackburn and Coid (1999), as cited by Gilbert and Daffern (2011), 
determined that 47% to 69% of offenders convicted of serious violent crimes met the criteria for 
at least one personality disorder. Antisocial personality disorder was the most common. 
However, because such high proportions of offenders can be classified as having antisocial 
personality disorder, there cannot be a categorical inclusion in the definition of criminally insane. 
Therefore, this and other personality disorders need to be further examined. 
Personality disorders are noted for their long-standing, maladaptive patterns of 
experience and conduct that impacts a person’s interactions with the world across time and 
environment. The three most common personality diagnoses are Paranoid Personality Disorder, 
Antisocial Personality Disorder, and Borderline Personality Disorder. Although there are slight 
variations between the three, they share the same main characteristics (Kinscherff, 2010). 
According to DSM-IV criteria, an individual with a personality disorder has an enduring pattern 
of inner experience that deviates from the expectations of the individual’s culture. The pattern is 
manifested in two or more of the following areas: cognition, affectivity, interpersonal 
functioning, or impulse control. The pattern is long in duration and present across a range of 
social situations and leads to distress in important areas of functioning (DSM-IV, 2000). 
Personality disorders are of interest to criminal justice researchers because they correlate highly 
with recidivism rates. It is estimated by Hiscoke et. al (2003) that reconviction rates for 
manslaughter, attempted or completed murder, rape, assault, or robbery were 3.7 times higher for 
individuals with personality disorders than reconviction rates in those without a personality 
disorder (Gilbert and Daffern, 2011).  
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 Stupperich et. al (2009) proposes that offenders with personality disorders are more 
fearful of being left and more physically violent than the general population. Men with 
personality disorders are six times more likely to batter their wives than men without personality 
disorders. Antisocial and Borderline Personality Disorders are among the most commonly 
referenced subtypes in literature on intimate partner violence (Babcock and Ross, 2009). 
Individuals with personality disorders have higher rates of suicide, substance abuse disorders, 
intense emotional dysregulation, and distortions of perceived threat than the general population. 
They also experience despair and desperation contributing to poorly planned actions. The 
emotional dysregulation in combination with distortions in perceived threat is one of the most 
important characteristics contributing to participation in violent crime. Persons with personality 
disorders commonly have acute episodes of psychotic experiences, which is a risk factor for 
violent crime as well (Kinscherff, 2010). 
 Johnson et.al (2000) conducted a longitudinal study of 717 youths from upstate New 
York between 1983 and 1993 which assessed personality disorder symptoms and violent 
behaviors. He concluded that youths with personality disorders were significantly more likely 
than the sample of individuals with no personality disorder to commit violent crimes such as 
arson, vandalism, threats to injure others, mugging, and physical fights after controlling for all 
other covariates such as socioeconomic status and parental psychopathy. Although the sample 
contained individuals under the age of 18 with no diagnosis of a personality disorder (which 
cannot be diagnosed until age 18), they showed high levels of personality disorder symptoms and 
many were diagnosed with a personality disorder after the age of 18. Johnson et. al proposes that 
higher levels of psychological factors such as frustration, anger, emotional dysregulation, and 
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social cognition deficiencies may be responsible for the commission of crimes (Johnson et. al, 
2000).  
Gilbert and Daffern (2011) propose the General Aggression Model (GAM) to explain that 
offenders with personality disorders, especially those with Antisocial Personality Disorder, have 
more constructs such as aggression-related knowledge structures, maladaptive cognitions, and 
anger than those of the general population. The GAM assumes that all aggressive behaviors are a 
result of the combination of the individual and the environment, but proposes that the cognitions 
of those with personality disorders cause them to act aggressively given the same situational 
factors as someone without a personality disorder (Gilbert and Daffern, 2011). 
 Young et. al (2003), as cited by Gilbert and Daffern, examines the importance of EMS or 
early maladaptive schema in people with personality disorders. These EMS are developed early 
in life in response to negative events as a way to avoid extreme emotional discomfort. The EMS 
are somewhat distorted representations of and adaptations to the environment. Young and 
colleagues contend that dysfunctional behaviors develop in response to these EMS, therefore 
leading to an increased propensity for aggressive behaviors (Gilbert and Daffern, 2011). 
 In addition to EMS, people with personality disorders have a higher availability of 
aggressive scripts, measured by the Schedule of Imagined Violence (Grisso et al., 2000). This 
scale determines whether or not a person has mental imagery of physically harming others, and 
the frequency and chronicity of these thoughts. For people with more aggressive scripts, an 
aggressive response will be triggered in more situations than a person with normal levels of 
aggressive scripts. Frequent rehearsal of the scripts makes the script more accessible, creating a 
feedback mechanism which increases the likelihood of violent responses. Offenders with 
personality disorders frequently believe that violence is the only way to respond to a situation 
16 
 
when an individual without a personality disorder would not consider aggression as a response. 
The GAM proposes that the combination of accessible aggressive cognitions and aggressive 
scripts and experience of internal states that activate the aggressive cognitions are responsible for 
the aggressive behavior (Gilbert and Daffern, 2011). 
 Another possible explanation for increased aggression in people with personality 
disorders is maladaptive defense mechanisms that promote a tendency to direct aggression 
toward others, especially in persons with Antisocial Personality Disorder. Defense mechanisms 
are defined as unconscious mental operations that protect against extreme negative emotions and 
excessive anxiety (Presniak, Olson, and MacGreggor, 2010). Results of studies regarding 
defense mechanisms may be inaccurate because it is difficult to have patients consciously 
describe their unconscious mental operations. Presniak et al. attempt to address this problem by 
using multiple questionnaires and methods of measurement. Presniak’s study supported 
devaluation of others and grandiosity as two defenses that were significantly higher in the group 
with APD as compared to the control group with no personality disorder. These defenses cause a 
person with a personality disorder, when faced with challenge by another, to devalue the other’s 
opinion and have an unrealistic sense of superiority, in turn causing conflict.  
 As described, personality disorders have been linked to violence and high recidivism 
rates. It has also been suggested that the early maladaptive schema and high level of aggressive 
scripts in individuals with personality disorders are linked to an increase in violence (Gilbert and 
Daffern, 2011; Presniak et al., 2010). Although there is abundant research on perceptions of 
culpability of individuals with schizophrenia and mental disability, there is a lack of research 
concerning perceptions of culpability of individuals with personality disorders.  
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A study by Fraser and Gallop (1993) examined how the label of borderline personality 
disorder affects staff’s perceptions and causal attributions about patient’s behavior. The sample 
consisted of 164 patients and 17 registered nurses in four psychiatric units. The patient sample 
consisted of individuals with schizophrenia (12.8%), affective disorder (55.4%), borderline 
personality disorder (20.7%), and “other” which consisted of any diagnosis other than the three 
previously mentioned.  There were two components to the study. First, Fraser and Gallop 
observed group “discussions” in the psychiatric units and recorded patient behaviors and staff 
responses. He was unaware of the diagnoses of the individuals. Heineken’s 
Confirmation/Disconfirmation Rating Instrument was used to rate and code nurse’s responses to 
patients. The classification system had seven response categories: confirming, disparagement, 
inadequate, ambiguous, impervious, indifferent, and tangential. Differences between confirming 
and disconfirming responses were calculated for each patient by subtracting the total confirming 
score from the total disconfirming score. Results of this component of the study showed 
significant differences in confirming/disconfirming responses between diagnostic groups. 
Significant differences were found between the affective disorders and borderline personality 
disorder (BPD) groups and between the BPD and “other” groups. No difference was found 
between the BPD and schizophrenia groups.  
The second component of the study by Fraser and Gallop (1993) used the Staff Response 
subscale of Colson’s Hospital Treatment Rating Scale (1986) to investigate nurses’ self-reported 
responses to specific diagnostic categories. This scale used 16 emotional response items and the 
same staff was used for both components of the study. Participants were given a description of a 
patient exhibiting challenging behavior in which he or she was diagnosed with affective disorder, 
schizophrenia, or BPD. Patients with borderline personality disorder attracted more negative 
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responses from staff than those with the label of schizophrenia or affective disorder. The causes 
of the negative behavior were rated as more stable in patients with BPD, and the patient was 
thought to be more in control of his behaviors. Additionally, staff reported less sympathy and 
less optimism for patients with BPD.   
Results of this study by Fraser and Gallop (1993) should be interpreted with caution as 
there was only a single rater of confirming and disconfirming responses in the first component of 
the study. However, the rater’s notes from the discussions did not show extreme differences in 
behaviors between groups that would elicit different staff responses. This study supports that 
BPD generates negative and stereotypical responses regarding behavior. This study is of value to 
my research because these stereotypical responses to individuals with personality disorders are 
important in a legal context. Individuals may unconsciously react more negatively to offenders 
with personality disorders than those with other mental illnesses or with no mental illness, 
leading to unfavorable judgments and verdict choices.  
My research will explore how community perceptions of mental illness affect their 
perceptions of culpability and how people perceive the culpability of offenders with personality 
disorders in comparison to offenders with schizophrenia and those with no mental illness. 
Participants will be given a crime vignette about an individual diagnosed as troubled (control), 
with schizophrenia, or with borderline personality disorder. They will then be asked about their 
perceptions of responsibility for the crime and recommend a punishment. I hypothesize that 
participants will perceive individuals with schizophrenia as less responsible for their actions than 
individuals with a personality disorder and will consequently judge individuals with 
schizophrenia as not guilty by reason of insanity more often than individuals with a personality 
disorder. I also hypothesize that individuals with sympathize less with individuals with a 
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personality disorder than individuals with schizophrenia or with no mental illness. I believe 
individuals will be less likely to sentence individuals to a prison term if the individual suffers 
from schizophrenia as compared to an individual with a personality disorder. 
 
METHODS 
Sample 
 The sample contained 75 participants: 50 females (66.7%) and 25 males (33.3%). The 
sample was recruited via Facebook and personal email. All participants are currently college 
students or college graduates. This study does not have IRB approval because it is for 
educational purposes only, although, participants were informed before beginning the survey that 
it was anonymous, voluntary, and for education purposes only.  
Design 
 The design included three vignettes modeled after vignettes used by Skeem and Golding 
(2002) and Ghetti and Redlich (2001). The three vignettes described a crime committed by an 
individual labeled as troubled (control condition), having schizophrenia, or having borderline 
personality disorder. Besides the label, every other aspect of the vignette was held constant. 
Participants were given a questionnaire which assessed participant’s perceptions of responsibility 
of the offender, sympathy toward the offender, and how the offender should be punished. The 
vignettes are listed below. 
• Vignette A. David is a twenty nine year old man who lives alone in an apartment in the 
city. David has never been able to keep a girlfriend for long but has a good relationship 
with his family. He has been working at a department store for the last three months. 
When things go wrong, he gets nervous and has trouble sleeping.  Last week, David had 
an argument with his neighbor, Joe, who made vicious comments about David’s family. 
When David confronted Joe about the comments, a physical fight ensued. Immediately 
after the fight, David returned to the Joe’s house with a gun and shot him. Joe died as a 
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result of David’s actions. Police responded immediately and arrested David. He was 
examined by a court psychiatrist who indicated that David suffers from schizophrenia, a 
serious mental illness. 
• Vignette B. David is a twenty nine year old man who lives alone in an apartment in the 
city. David has never been able to keep a girlfriend for long but has a good relationship 
with his family. He has been working at a department store for the last three months. 
When things go wrong, he gets nervous and has trouble sleeping.  Last week, David had 
an argument with his neighbor, Joe, who made vicious comments about David’s family. 
When David confronted Joe about the comments, a physical fight ensued. Immediately 
after the fight, David returned to the Joe’s house with a gun and shot him. Joe died as a 
result of David’s actions. Police responded immediately and arrested David. He was 
examined by a court psychiatrist who indicated that David had no serious mental illness 
present, but seemed ‘troubled.’ 
• Vignette C. David is a twenty nine year old man who lives alone in an apartment in the 
city. David has never been able to keep a girlfriend for long but has a good relationship 
with his family. He has been working at a department store for the last three months. 
When things go wrong, he gets nervous and has trouble sleeping.  Last week, David had 
an argument with his neighbor, Joe, who made vicious comments about David’s family. 
When David confronted Joe about the comments, a physical fight ensued. Immediately 
after the fight, David returned to the Joe’s house with a gun and shot him. Joe died as a 
result of David’s actions. Police responded immediately and arrested David. He was 
examined by a court psychiatrist who indicated that David suffers from borderline 
personality disorder.  
Procedure 
 Participants were given links to one of three online surveys, each containing one of the 
vignettes. Links were randomly assigned to participants via Facebook and personal email. 
Participation lasted approximately five minutes, and participants were not compensated for their 
time.  Participants were asked to indicate a verdict choice (guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by 
reason of insanity) and a punishment (no punishment, probation, prison term, or confinement to a 
psychiatric institution). Seven point Likert scales (1=very little and 7=a lot) were used to assess 
participants’ perceptions of culpability, responsibility, dangerousness, sympathy, and credibility 
of the offender (see Appendix for questionnaire). Age and gender were also recorded for each 
participant. Age was not significantly different across conditions.   
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RESULTS 
 Verdict decision counts by condition are shown in the table below. Because there were 
either 0 or 1 decisions of “not guilty” across the three conditions, “not guilty” and “not guilty by 
reason of insanity” were coded together into a new variable shown as “not guilty by reason of 
insanity” below. The Perason Chi-Square analysis is not significant, χ2 (2)= 5.367, p=.068, 
meaning condition did not have a significant effect on verdict decision. 
 
 
 
 Not Guilty By 
Reason of Insanity 
Guilty Total 
Control- Count 
 
3 22 25 
- % Within Condition 
 
12% 88% 100% 
Personality Disorder- Count 
 
12 18 30 
- % Within Condition 
 
40% 60% 100% 
Schizophrenia- Count 
 
7 18 25 
- % Within Condition 
 
28% 72% 100% 
 
No participants in any of the conditions chose probation as a punishment so it is omitted 
from the table below. In addition, across all conditions only one participant chose “no 
punishment” so it was omitted from the analysis as well. Participants were more likely to choose 
commitment to a psychiatric institution as punishment for the personality disorder condition 
(58.6%) than for the schizophrenia condition (52%) or the control condition (8%). Pearson Chi 
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Square analysis,  χ2(2)= 15.557, p=.000, showed that condition had a significant effect on 
punishment choice (p<.05).  
 Prison 
Term 
Commitment to Psychiatric Institution Total 
Control- Count 
 
22 2 24 
- % Within Condition 
 
91.7% 8.3% 100% 
Personality Disorder- Count 
 
12 17 29 
- % Within Condition 
 
41.4% 58.6% 100% 
Schizophrenia 
 
12 13 25 
- % Within Condition 48% 52% 100% 
 
To determine if each of the five variables (culpability, responsibility, dangerousness, 
credibility, and sympathy) were significantly different in each of the test conditions 
(schizophrenia, personality disorder, or no disorder), ANOVAs were performed. Confidence was 
the only condition to show significance in the ANOVA (F=4.356, sig=.016) signifying an 
interaction between condition and confidence ratings. Post Hoc LSD tests revealed that 
participants were significantly more confident of their verdict decisions for the control condition 
than the personality disorder condition. In addition, participants were significantly more 
confident of their verdict decisions for the control condition than for the schizophrenia condition.  
Differences between schizophrenia and personality disorder were not significant.  
 Control Personality Disorder Schizophrenia 
Confidence M 5.08 a 
(SD .812) 
M 4.30 b 
(SD 1.208) 
M 4.38 b 
(SD 1.208) 
Credibility M 3.64 
(SD 1.036) 
M3.53 
(SD 1.167) 
M 3.52 
(SD 1.388) 
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Dangerousness M 4.56 
(SD 1.474) 
M 4.31 
(SD 1.072) 
M 4.92 
(SD 1.248) 
Responsibility M 5.76 
(SD .663) 
M 5.55 
(SD .736) 
M 5.24 
(SD 1.091) 
Sympathy M 2.68 
(SD 1.314) 
M 2.90 
(SD 1.062) 
M 2.68 
(SD 1.345) 
Note: Means with different subscripts are significantly different at p<.05.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Earlier in this paper I discussed the importance of juror’s perceptions of mental illness on 
verdict decisions. Stereotypes and preconceptions of these individuals cause bias in their 
decision making (Skeem and Golding, 2002). Since individuals with a serious mental illness are 
at an increased risk of entering the criminal justice system, this topic merits special interest 
(Bonta et al., 1998).  
Skeem and Golding (2002) suggest that negative attitudes toward the insanity defense are 
highly influential on juror’s decision making and are change resistant. Results of this study 
support these conclusions. The presence of a personality disorder or schizophrenia significantly 
lowered participant’s confidence of their verdict decisions, however the specific disorder did not 
seem to matter in confidence ratings. The results support that the presence of a mental health 
disorder affect juror’s verdict decisions.  
Minster and Knowles (2006) found that 44% of people believed that the mentally ill had 
the potential be to be violent. Interestingly, results of this study showed that participants did not 
rate the individuals with schizophrenia or a personality disorder as more dangerous than the 
individual with no mental illness. However, offenders with a personality disorder or 
schizophrenia were judged as less credible than an offender with no mental disorder, though not 
to a significant level.  
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According to Fraser and Gallop’s (1993) results, nurses’ responses were more negative 
toward patients with a personality disorder than patients with affective disorders or “other” 
mental illnesses, probably signifying that the nurses felt less sympathy for these patients. 
Contrary to my hypothesis, participants rated sympathy for the offender almost equally across all 
three conditions. They showed no more sympathy for an offender with a mental illness than one 
with no mental illness. The vignettes used in this study did not describe behaviors specific to 
individuals with personality disorders or schizophrenia, which could explain one reason for this 
discrepancy. Perhaps because all vignettes gave the offender the exact same characteristics 
besides the diagnostic label, participants did not consider other characteristics of the diagnosis 
that were not explicitly mentioned in the vignettes.  
According to Vicki Smith’s prototype theory (cited by Skeem and Golding, 2002), a juror 
will make attributions about offenders by comparing the offender’s characteristics to those of his 
prototype of a mentally ill offender. Skeem and Golding’s study demonstrated that individuals 
most commonly reported a SMD prototype, which is generally inaccurate in describing offenders 
who plead insanity. The SMD emphasizes severe functional impairment and intellectual 
disability. Another prototype, reported by about one third of the participants, represented a 
psychotic individual. In my study, only 28% of participants in the schizophrenia condition and 
40% of participants in the personality disorder condition found the offender not guilty by reason 
of insanity. The rate of not guilty by reason of insanity verdicts is not as high as expected. 
According to the prototype theory, some individuals may have judged individuals with a 
personality disorder and a personality disorder as guilty because they do not display 
characteristics that fit the SMD prototype, similar to the “wild beast standard” of the 1700’s.  
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Results showed that condition had a significant effect on punishment. Participants were 
significantly more likely to sentence offenders with a personality disorder or schizophrenia to 
commitment to a psychiatric institution than the control condition. Although participants were 
more likely to sentence individuals with a mental illness to a psychiatric institution than to a 
prison term, results were not as drastic as expected. Almost half of the participants for both the 
schizophrenia and personality disorder conditions recommended a prison term as a punishment. 
A large proportion of participants found the offender guilty but recommended commitment to a 
psychiatric institution as punishment. One explanation for this discrepancy could be a lack of 
knowledge about what happens to offenders who are actually found not guilty by reason of 
insanity. As Skeem and Golding (2002) highlight, many laypeople express that the insanity 
defense is a “loophole” in the criminal justice system which allows guilty criminals to escape 
punishment. Participants in the study may have felt that the offender had a mental illness and 
was not responsible for their actions but chose the guilty verdict because they believed the 
offender still deserved punishment. Another possible explanation is that the participants 
recognized the presence of a mental disorder but did not think it directly caused the offender’s 
actions.   
Examining these results, I believe it would be interesting to examine individual’s 
perceptions of the functions of different punishments for offenders with mental illness. It would 
be interesting to see if individuals perceive the function of commitment to a psychiatric 
institution as punishment, as rehabilitation, or as solely a deterrent. I believe it is necessary to 
give jurors explicit instructions regarding exactly what will happen to offenders who are found 
not guilty by reason of insanity, especially in cases where the insanity defense may be raised. 
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Although further research into perceptions of mental illnesses is needed, this study provides 
evidence that the presence of a mental illness does affect juror’s decision-making.  
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APPENDIX  
 
1. What is your age?     ____________ 
 
2. What is your gender?   Male    Female  
 
3. If you were a juror at David’s trial would you find David 
 
Guilty   Not Guilty   Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 
                       (A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity 
requires that at the time of the act, due to a 
severe mental defect, the defendant is unable to 
appreciate the nature and quality of the 
wrongfulness of his acts) 
 
4. Please rate the confidence of your verdict choice 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
very confident   very confident 
of innocence   of guilty 
 
 
5.    Regardless of whether you think David is guilty or not, how likely is it that David is responsible  
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for Joe’s death? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 not likely    likely 
 
 
      6.  How credible do you find David? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 not at all   very much so  
 
 
     7.  How much sympathy do you have for David? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 none              a lot 
 
 
     8. How dangerous is David to the community? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 not dangerous    extremely dangerous 
 at all 
 
 
     9. How should David be punished? 
No Punishment     Probation      Prison Term          Commitment to Psychiatric Institution 
 
